17. It should be noted that the subsection (1) is an enabling provision. An applicant in a special benefit remedy may apply for additional facilities mentioned in clauses (a) and b). The clause (a) includes, in addition to special benefits, facilities of ownership and division as well as separate assets. The mandate of Section 22, sub-section 22, is that the Tribunal does not grant discharge under clauses (a) and (b) subsection (1), unless it has been the subject of an express request. It follows that no jurisdiction may grant exemption from ownership of real estate or other property subject to the sale agreement for which a defined benefit is claimed, unless the property is expressly sought. In April 2002, the applicant purchased agricultural machinery financed by a lease-sale of the second defendant. The machine was delivered in October 2002. The applicant was then arrested by the Gardai on the grounds that the machine was not suitable for transport on Irish roads. The applicant returned the machine to the first accused in October 2003 and returned the proceedings in July 2008. The High Court found that the infringement application was not prescribed, as the limitation period in question runs from the date the machine was delivered in October 2002 and not from the date of the contract. In I.S. Sikandar v. K.
Subramani, the Supreme Court held that, in the event of non-recourse, it was necessary to conclude and declare that a denunciation was unlawful and that the additional discharge could not be granted for the implementation of the denounced agreement: “24. In many cases, the term “availability and availability” was already an object of interpretation prior to its inclusion in Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. When considering the question of how and how, the applicant is required to prove his financial availability in order to allow him to claim some performance of the contract/agreement, the Privy Council in a case of major importance, By the Indian Courts (Bombay) at Bank of India Ltd. v. Jamsetji A.H. Chinoy, upheld Chagla.C.J.`s opinion, including that the respondent must take legal action and prove that he was willing and willing to carry out his part of the contract permanently between the date of the contract and the date of the action.” In the most recent case of Murphy v. Joe O`Toole – Sons Ltd- Anor  IEHC 486, Baker J. found that the limitation period for a merchandise sale agreement ran from the date of delivery of the goods and not from the date the parties entered into the contract. The judge found that under section 1 of the Property Sales Act in 1893, “the delivery of goods and the simultaneous obligation to pay the goods are the point at which the contract or sale agreement becomes a sale and, if there was one, occurred during execution or delivery, when the contract was no longer enforceable, but was executed.” The Supreme Court found that during the course of the trial, the complainant presented the Tribunal with documents indicating that the value of the property was six lakhs and thirty thousand rupees on November 20, 2006.